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The First 
Amendment 
and the Flag 
Bruce Berner 
The Supreme Court's flag-
desecration decision, Texas -u John-
son, has set off a storm of reaction: 
articles decrying the decision as 
an outrage; calls for curative legis-
lation and/or constitutional 
amendment and/or impeach-
ment;general harrumphing. My 
main objective is to locate the flag-
burning issue within the basic 
structure of freedom-of-expression 
analysis and sharpen the question; 
my subsidiary objective is to argue 
briefly that the decision was cor-
rect 
Gregory Johnson, as a 
participant in an anti-Reagan, 
anti-nuclear protest during the 
1984 Republican Convention in 
Dallas, burned an American flag 
while singing, "America, the red, 
white, and blue, we spit on you." 
Official response to this delightful-
ly crafted composition-in sonata 
form, no doubt-remains 
unknown, but the flagburning 
prompted criminal prosecution 
Bruce Berner teaches in the School 
of Law at Valparaiso University. The 
Cresset welcomes him as a new contib-
utor to "The Nation." 
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under this Texas statute: 
Desecration ofVenerated Object: 
(a) A person commits an 
offense if he intentionally or knowing-
ly desecrates: 
(1) a public monument; 
(2) a place of worship or burial; 
or 
(3) a state or national flag. 
(b) For purposes of this section, 
"desecrate" means deface, damage, or 
otherwise physically mistreat in a way 
that the actor knows will seriously 
offend one or more persons likely to 
observe or discover his action. 
His conviction was reviewed by the 
Supreme Court, which held, 5-4, 
that the statute's application to 
Johnson violated the first-amend-
ment protection of expression. 
The decision was neither 
"a departure from 200 years of his-
tory" nor "inevitable," as charac-
terized by two nationally syndicat-
ed columnists from opposite ends 
of the political spectrum. The 
Court had never ruled squarely on 
the issue, though dicta assuming 
the government's power to so reg-
ulate appeared in judicial opin-
ions of such well-credentialed civil 
libertarians as Earl Warren, Hugo 
Black, and Abe Fortas. On the 
other hand, leading constitutional 
law authorities Qohn Hart Ely of 
Stanford and Laurence Tribe of 
Harvard, among others) state that 
flag-desecration statutes can only 
with great torture be made to fit 
with first-amendment principles as 
they are currently designed. 
Nevertheless, had the 5-4 
decision gone the other way, it 
need not have compromised first-
amendment jurisprudence gener-
ally because the Court could treat 
the flag as sui generis, an absolutely 
special case, standing (flying?) 
alone. Placing the flag in a class 
by itself would preserve other first-
amendment doctrines against the 
axiom, "hard cases make bad law." 
But such a special exception, if 
unaccompanied by principled sup-
port, preserves coherence only by 
admitting incoherence. A consti-
tutional amendment exempting 
flag desecration from first-amend-
ment protection would, of course, 
achieve the result its proponents 
desire. But it would not produce 
theoretical coherence unless the 
discourse of public or ratification 
debate articulated some larger 
principle which· could explain and 
accommodate both the first 
amendment and the flag amend-
ment Nothing in the dissenting 
opinion suggests this larger princi-
ple other than a tour de force that 
the flag is "special" or "unique". It 
is a very special, unique, revered 
symbol, but this does not begin to 
explain why it should be placed 
outside the first amendment. 
Indeed, many believe that a large 
part of the flag's uniqueness is the 
majestic, calm assurance with 
which it tolerates bitter dissent 
At the heart of protection 
for expression lies the notion that, 
on balance, it is best to expose all 
ideas, however contemptible, to 
the open air of "the marketplace 
of ideas." Rather than imprison 
those who speak the thought we 
hate, this marketplace will often 
drive them into ideological 
bankruptcy, can render them, in 
Justice Douglas's words, "the mis-
erable merchants of unwanted 
wares." And while we do not shut 
up Gregory Johnson, neither do 
we still the voice of Copernicus. 
Speaking in the 1943 decision 
banning compulsory flag salute, 
the Court, through Justice Jack-
son, stated: "If there is any fixed 
star in our constitutional constella-
tion, it is that no official, high or 
petty, can prescribe what shall be 
orthodox in politics, nationalism, 
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religion, or other matters of opin-
ion." Several years later at the 
Nuremberg trials, Justice Jackson 
would get a close look at a regime 
which followed a different star. 
The following brief and over-
simplified summary of the struc-
ture of first-amendment analysis 
might help to locate the flagburn-
ing issue and, incidentally, to dis-
tinguish other issues often 
invoked (sometimes erroneously) 
in the recent literature. The fol-
lowing hypothetical regulations 
are employed to demonstrate the 
structure. Assume that each is vio-
lated by a defendant through 
expressive or communicative 
speech or conduct. 
A. No writing communist slo-
gans on the Washington Monu-
ment. 
B. No writing anything on the 
Washington Monument. 
C. No burning draft cards. 
(Assume a draft in effect) 
D. No loud noises in residen-
tial areas. 
E. No passing out handbills. 
F. No false advertising. 
G. No burning the American 
flag in public or private. 
Governmental regulation 
can abridge expression in either 
of two ways. First, a regulation 
may be aimed at the communica-
tive impact of ideas or informa-
tion because the regulator does 
not like either the content or 
effect of their dissemination (e.g., 
Regulation A). For identification, 
we shall call these direct regula-
tions of expression. Second, a reg-
ulation may be aimed at conduct's 
noncommunicative impact (e.g., 
Regulation D aims at noise abate-
ment, not at the message or its 
effect) but nevertheless incidental-
ly abridge communicative oppor-
tunity--both the nonexpressing 
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teenager with a boombox and the 
expressing electioneer with a 
loudspeaker are prohibited by 
Regulation D. This is an indirect 
regulation of expression. 
In cases of indirect regula-
tion, the Court essentially bal-
ances the benefit of the regulation 
(quiet neighborhoods) against the 
incremental costs to expression 
(the electioneer must get the 
word out in other ways); but, 
because first-amendment interests 
are involved, the balance is con-
ducted, in Professor Kalven's col-
orful phrase, "with a thumb on 
the scale" in favor of expression. 
Notwithstanding the "thumb,"Reg-
ulation D has been found constitu-
tional; likewise, Regulation B (no 
writing anything on the Washing-
ton Monument) properly pre-
serves a unique national landmark 
and avoids the cost and trouble of 
sandblasting or other repair even 
though it removes a channel for 
communication, be it "Down with 
the Government" or "Patti loves 
Johnny." The Court upheld Regu-
lation C (no burning draft cards) 
only upon a showing that the 
destruction of cards, whether 
done publicly for expressive pur-
poses or privately, hampered the 
administrative effectiveness of the 
Selective Service System. 
Not surprisingly, the 
Court views direct regulation with 
much more suspicion. Although 
the first amendment is not "abso-
lute" in even these cases (witness 
defamatory speech or falsely 
shouting "Fire!" in a crowded the-
ater), the governmental interest in 
the regulation must be powerful 
or "compelling" to support it, as 
with speech carrying a "clear and 
present danger" of inciting to riot. 
To extend Kalven's metaphor, the 
Court calls on itself, in direct regu-
lation cases, to stand on the scale 
in favor of expression. (This is 
another good reason not to 
appoint judicial lightweights.) 
Regulation A (no writing commu-
nist slogans on the Washington 
Monument) could not pass 
muster. Note that it explicitly reg-
ulates a particular brand of politi-
cal expression. What legitimate 
interest does the Government 
have to keep "Hooray for Stalin" 
off the monument that would not 
also seek to exclude 'To Hell with 
the Mets"? Regulation B (no writ-
ing anything on the Washington 
Monument), the indirect regula-
tion discussed earlier, would con-
stitutionally prohibit both inscrip-
tions even though it is aimed at 
neither but at preserving govern-
ment property against vandalism. 
Regulation F (no false advertis-
ing), while directly aimed at the 
effect of disseminated informa-
tion, has obvious compelling justi-
fication. Moreover, though com-
mercial speech is protected, it is 
political expression which is at the 
core of the first amendment. 
This two-track analytical 
structure raises a complicating fea-
ture: since scrutiny is much less 
stringent in indirect- regulation 
cases, regulators might try to dis-
guise a direct regulation as indi-
rect. Some have argued that this 
occurred in the draft-card-burn-
ing case, that physical integrity of 
the cards had nothing to do with 
the smooth functioning of the sys-
tem but was a subterfuge to sup-
press unorthodox expression dur-
ing the Vietnam War. Regulation 
E (no passing out handbills ) 
might be advanced as an anti-litter 
regulation (indirect), but context 
and timing could indicate it is 
aimed at particular person with 
particular messages (direct) . 
Regulation G (no burning 
the American flag in public or pri-
vate), one of the proposed legisla-
tive reactions to the Johnson deci-
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sion, is instructive. If its motiva-
tion were perceived as a sub-
terfuge for direct regulation of 
abhorrent expressive conduct 
(and, come on, what else is it?), it 
is controlled by Johnson and, 
therefore, unconstitutional. If, 
alternatively, we naively took the 
proponents at their word and 
accepted the regulation as protect-
ing "the physical integrity of the 
cloth and emblem even against its 
owner from destruction of any 
kind, public or private, expressive 
or not," we would have to concede 
that it is only an indirect regula-
tion aimed not at expression but 
at preserving this cloth. So far, so 
good. But, the moment the regu-
lation is applied against an expres-
sive flagburning, the Court must 
weigh the expression interest 
(together with thumb) against the 
interest in this cloth. But how 
weighty is the government's inter-
est in preventing people from 
burning their own flags in the pri-
vacy of their own homes? Is it 
afraid we'll run out and forget 
how to make more? This "inter-
est" sounds like H.L. Mencken's 
definition of Puritanism: "The 
haunting fear that somebody, 
somewhere, is doing something 
naughty." 
The Government may, of 
course, clearly prohibit any defac-
ing of particular flags, like the 
ones on the Capitol or Fort 
McHenry, to preserve historical 
relics or merely to defend its own 
property. And surely the theft 
statute covers stealing or vandaliz-
ing others' flags. These regula-
tions aim at any kind of misuse, 
expressive or not 
The Texas desecration 
statute is clearly a direct regula-
tion of expression. The dissenting 
justices and the State of Texas con-
cede that it does not apply to clos-
et flagburnings but only to those 
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public ones which "seriously 
offend" others. It is not sufficient, 
therefore, to argue that the inter-
est in preserving the flag's dignity 
outweighs the interest in permit-
ting this form of expression. How-
ever offensive and gratuitous the 
message of the flagburner is (and 
Texas concedes that Johnson was 
engaged in symbolic expression), 
the government must state a 
"compelling" justification for sti-
fling it 
When the Court engages 
in this stand-on-the-scale balanc-
ing of direct regulation, the 
strength, appropriateness, or val-
ue of the expression is not rele-
vant. All expression has the same 
constitutional weight-to evaluate 
it is to miss the whole point. Of 
course Johnson's expressive con-
duct was offensive, gratuitous, 
even heartbreaking. The dissent 
evokes this well with reference to 
the rich history and meaning of 
the flag-Francis Scott Key, Iwo 
Jima, parades, even the entire text 
of Whittier's "Barbara Frietchie": 
"Shoot if you must, this old grey 
head, But spare your country's 
flag .... " What really upsets us is 
that Johnson is co-opting the flag 
for his own purposes. Most of us 
believe him insensitive and wrong. 
Say so. Tell one another. Tell him. 
Tell him why. The cure is more 
speech, not less. 
The Court next analyzed 
the governmental purposes for 
this direct regulation. The State 
of Texas advanced two: preventing 
breaches of the peace; and pre-
serving the flag as a symbol of 
nationhood and national unity. 
As to the first, Texas already has a 
"disturbing-the-peace" statute and, 
at any rate, the demonstration was 
in all respects peaceful. As to the 
second, burning a flag makes the 
flag no less a symbol of nation-
hood. And why should Americans 
be interested in national uni~ 
produced by compulsion? The 
profound thrill at parades is not 
that everyone stands when the flag 
passes, but that everyone wants to 
stand. 
Beyond that, long before 
Johnson desecrated the flag, we 
have trivialized it-on candy bars, 
advertisements, litter bags 
announcing "Smith for Alder-
man", and so on. And some dese-
crate the flag by wrapping them-
selves in it. All of this makes it dif-
ficult to accord "compelling'" 
weight to the unique-symbol argu-
ment. It is simply not enough that 
flag desecration makes us feel 
awful. 
None of this is to say that 
Johnson did not minimize the flag 
or our reverence for it He meant 
to and he did. The people who 
claim hurt and outrage are not all 
posturing and cannot be responsi-
bly dismissed as unenlightened. 
The first-amendment guarantee, 
like freedom itself, is not free. It 
en tails real, painful costs, and 
some people bear more than their 
fair share. That we must pay these 
costs is a sad truth; history records 
that the failure to pay them 
reveals sadder ones. 
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Corrections: 
The Editor regrets that footnote 
numbers were omitted from the 
text of Jon Pahl's article on antin<r 
mianism in the September Cressd. 
Readers who would like to know 
for certain where the footnotes 
were placed are invited to request 
a corrected copy of the article. 
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